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CHAPTER I

Dignity in Ho1ner and Classical Greece
Patrice Rankine

"tl\
\Var is war, but dinner should be served on time.
-UKRAINIAN SAYING

Woven into the distress of Homeric epic, which often laments the
terrors of war, the violence of passion, and the desperation of life, are
records of ancient customs that hint at a deep respect for culture and
human worth. To take but one example, recall Hector's refusal to take
wine from his mother when he is bloody from battle. This moment
is apt to strike modern readers as trivial. In fact, it reifies important
ancient distinctions between war and peace, home and battlefield,
and the equally ancient sentiment that to everything, there is a sea
son. In this case, no matter what has occurred in war in Homer's Iliad,
the poem makes clear there is a time to put away unrest, eat together,
and, afterward, revere humanity. That is, there is an injunction to
make space for acting in ways that acknowledge mutual value. Thus a
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repeated formula throughout the epics to affirm that "after they [ often
male warriors] had put away their desire for eating and drinking;' then
comes a time for the bard's entertainment, games, or strategic discus
sions (e.g., book 12.310).1 As Jasper Griffin describes this element of the
epics, " Eating together is a universal mark of union, creating a bond:' 2
Given such a framework, one begins to wonder whether a concept of
human dignity existed as early as Homeric society (twelfth through the
eighth centuries DCE). Admittedly, there are reasons to balk. Homeric
Greeks engaged in ruthless war and acts of pillage, and at times mun
danely bought and sold persons at a price, as slaves. Moreover, nowhere
do the epics offer anything like explicit, formal criteria of human worth
that could be aligned easily to our contemporary western notion of
dignity. Homeric epics do not speak explicitly of an inherent or
unearned moral status, which status all humans share equally, and
which is supposed to ground fundamental human rights or protec
tions.3 Nevertheless, I shall argue that the epics do describe an array of
social practices that can be understood as precursors to such formal
ized criteria. Normative practices, such as sacrifice and reverence for
the gods and the treatment of others, demonstrated in such moments
as mealtime, suggest that there was indeed a sense in which individu
als were "raised above all price;' to borrow the Kantian language for
human dignity (AK 4:434).
To make this argument, it will be worth framing my chapter in terms
of one specific claim regarding human dignity, namely, that dignity
culminates in protections through law or through universal declara
tion, for example, as is true in the Universal Declaration of Human

1 For all translations, I have used a combination of my own reading of the Greek, along with some
aspects chat I like from Richmond Lattimore, western's translation, Stanley Lombardo's, and the Loeb
translation by A. T. Murray.
1 Jasper Griffin, Homer on Life and Dwb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
3 In speaking of "formal" criteria, I'm alluding to Remy Debes's distinction between substantive
and formal claims of human dignity. Remy Debes, "Dignity's Gauntlet," Philosophic,,! Perspectives 13
(2.003): 52..
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Rights of 1948. Now, on the one hand, some have thought declarations
like these to be mere historical contingencies because dignity itself is
contingent. Leonard Harris makes such an argument in his critique of
postcoloniality.4 For Harris, postcolonial theorists would make claims
like this to restore historically "impotent agents" -blacks, women,
non-Europeans-with a kind of dignity, as if dignity itself were not
always contingent (255). Harris argues that there are only "casual
agents" within contingent contexts, and thus even seeming funda
mental moral "truths" like human dignity are correspondingly limited
(254). On the other hand, of course, many others think declarations of
fundamental protections and rights reflect an important reality about
the "true" inner worth of humans.5 But which side of this particular
debate is correct doesn't concern me here. For my purposes, it suffices
to highlight the tendency to run together the existence of a concept
of dignity with its explicit enshrinement in something like a formal
declaration of rights. I will show that this tendency risks misleading
us when it comes to the Greeks. Thus, consider my hypothesis again,
now reformulated: The Greeks expressed a belief in human dignity.
Although they made no explicit (or philosophical) claim such as the
Universal Declaration asserts, they endorsed what Remy Debes calls
a "substantive" concept of dignity implicitly in practice; that is, they
treated human nature as being something that made it the basis of a
fundamental worth or status, though they did not theorize about the

4 Leonard Harris, "Honor, Eunuchs, and the Postcolonial Subject." in l'o.<tcoloni,tl African
Philosophy: A Critical Re,1dcr, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Ezc (New York: Blackwell, 1997), 151-59.
I am grateful to Professor Harris for reading a draft of this chapter and suggesting improvements.
5 As the prevailing view, examples ofthis alternative claim are in the ofling.1hus, consider that "post
human" theories now speak of the "indignity" that we, as human subjects, might someday avoid by
using technological advancement to overcome disease, deprivation, decay, and even death.1hese post
human theories strike many as wrongheaded precisely because they turn on a basic misunderstanding
of what dignity is. As Charles T. Rubin argues, such an approach takes a "contemptuous attitude to
what we actually are" (161), as ifto be limited in any way is to suffer the loss of dignity (making a "dig
nified death" an oxymoron). Charles T. Rubin, "Human Dignity and the Future of Man," in Hum,m
Dignity ,md Bioethics, ed. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Adam Schulman, and 1homas W. Merrill (Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2009), 155-71.

DIGNITY

22

general conceptual features of that status.6 In particular, they typically
did not see the dishonor of others-such as non-Greeks or enemies
in terms of either impotence (as one might see an orphan in ancient
times) or the hyperhuman (giants, Cyclops, etc., which also is to deny
humanity to an other). On the contrary, the Greeks asserted a sub
stance of dignity to be offered to others, even to those unlike them
selves. The substance of this dignity is a precursor to a formal claim
such as Kant's.
To be perfectly clear, then, the goal is not to argue for some hith
erto unnoticed explicit doctrine of dignity in Greek thought. Despite
the formalization of so many philosophical concepts by ancient Greek
philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, human dignity was not
one of them.7 Indeed, there is simply no succinct language for such a
concept. The Greek adjective axios is the closest approximation to the
Latin word that will come to be translated as "dignity;' dignus (adjec
tive), or dignitas (abstract noun) (which itself does not go as far as a
universal or legal claim).8 And yet the word axios, derived from the
verb ago, "lead;' "carry;' "hold," has to do with the value given to per
sons and things, as with "worth" in English. It is no surprise, then, that
what has "worth" (axios) in Greek is something with an equivalence
to other things, in terms of value. The advent of coinage in Greece
allowed for a correspondence of the item of worth to a monetary value.
Thus a diamond, of a certain monetary value, also has worth within
society, in terms of those things with which it can be exchanged. And
the same connotation of axios is applied to people in Homer. This is
only a connotation because it is clear that human reason and emotions

6 See Debes's introduction to this volume.
7 See George Kateb, Httm,m Dignity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, w11). W hen for•
malization of human dignity first occurred is as yet an open question and one being explored in this
volume.1he philosophical formalization might be attributed to Kant (see Sensen in this volume), but
the legal claim of universal human dignity does not occur until after World War II, as LaVaque-Manty
argues in this volume.
8 See Griffin in this volume.
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differentiate us from inanimate things. At the same time, the listener
hears that a handful of heroes are not worth-not equal in value to
Hector.9 The statement is an evaluation of Hector's military prowess
and, from what we know of Hector throughout the poem, his own
system of values, which prioritizes the gods, family, the city, and his
fellow man. Because of these values, Hector is worth much to his city,
Troy-more than money, more than other men. In short, persons, like
material objects, have value in comparison to other objects-and even
to other persons. 10 Moreover, "worth" is cognate to the Sanskrit vart-,
Latin verteri, "to turn;' which takes on the meaning of"to become;' as in
changing or "turning" into something else. The link between "worth"
and "becoming" (verteri, and also ago) already hints ataxios in Greek as
not an intrinsic value but as something one moves toward, something
even earned, further buttressing a sense of value that comes about in
relation to other things. Axios is thus not the equivalent to human dig
nity as that concept is generally understood today. Instead, axios points
to the complex of words linked to human value in Homeric society.
Such value is always contingent, comparative, not intrinsic. It might
be argued that each individual was raised above price, such that a slave
in Homer (Eumaeus) is understood to be (and to have been) noble.
Conversely, a noble could become a slave. Yet there was no widespread
threat to human dignity that necessitated the philosophical position.
Indeed, the Greek axios slowly became an attribute linked to social
class or rank in society. By the fifth century, for example, abstract forms
of axios (e.g., axioma and axiosis) began to appear in Herodotus and
the playwrights and were clearly references to the "honor" or reputa
tion of persons, making its ultimate meaning very close to the later
9 Liddell and Scott's entry for Homer 8.134.
ro 1he parallel passage cited in Liddell and Scott is from Herodotus, where Solon implicitly cor
rects Croesus's sense of what is valuable-namely, noble stock-for the worth of common Athenian
youth, Cleobis and Biron, who sacrificed their lives by taking on the yoke of oxen to make sure their
mother arrived at the temple of Delphi. See Herodotus r.JI-Jl. Whether their good behavior is a
result of their Athenianness begs the question of human dignity, despite the emphasis on their low
social standing that might evidence universal dignity.

-----
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Latin dignus/dignitas. Dignus, which is used in Latin much the way
axios was used in Greek, stems from a complex of words having to do
with appearance: Greek doceo, doxa, and Latin decet, derns, "seemly;'
"comely," derived from the Sanskrit word having to do with fame, dar
as. And obviously nothing in this family of meaning points to a sense
of dignity as a moral worth or stature that transcends contingencies,
with which a person might perhaps be born.
Despite the absence of a universal or formal claim to human dig
nity, however, or even the explicit language that would support such
a claim, it would be a mistake to conclude that the substance of a con
cept of dignity did not exist in Homeric Greece. In other words, just
because we don't find a theory of dignity in Homer, we should not
think the content is completely absent. Dignity is a concept similar to
what Orlando Patterson argues regarding "freedom:• in Freedom in the
Making of Tfestern Civilization, if only in the following respect: like
freedom, dignity is a widespread human value that is not articulated,
argued for, or formalized until extensive threats to it arise, along with
the possibility of its loss.11 Certainly honor can be lost in Patterson's
analysis, and slavery brings its indignity. Here I am simply echoing
Patterson's argument for "freedom" as that argument pertains to dig
nity: widespread threats to Greek freedom, according to Patterson,
occur in the fifth century BCE, when the rise of chattel slavery sud
denly made peoples vulnerable who hitherto had not faced the pos
sibility of enslavement.12 Although the Greeks (from 1600 BCE to at
least the Hellenistic period) were not immune to violations of human
dignity-which is to say, they did act in ways that today we would say
violate dignity-still, there was no cultural catastrophe so devastating
as to require its formal amplificationfar all Greeks, whether in legal or
other discursive terms. The incidental slave, captured enemy, or fall of a
city were not enough to cause these casual agents to come to a universal
Orlando Pmerson, Freedom in the M,1king ofiVestern Civilization (New York: Ba�ic Books, 1991).
,, Patterson, Freedom.
11
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formulation of what they had lost. Instead, human dignity is a sub
stantive given, and it is evident in several respects, from Homeric epic
through the classical period in Greece. In par�icular, it is literally put

into practice throughout the literature from Homer to the playwrights.
Thus, while it might seem that the treatment of Achilles or Hector
and their peers in Homeric epic stems only from their elevated status
within society, their nobility, or their fame, I will argue that a close
inspection of how the wider world is treated belies such a reading.
Alongside the representation of these high-ranked individuals, the
treatment of slaves, animals, and the material world shows that the
value extended to the noble classes is to a great extent also afforded to
others.

THE HOMERIC CONTEXT: AcHILLEs's TREATMENT
OF HECTOR IN THE fLIAD

The last book of Homer's Iliad has as its centerpiece a scene that is one
of the most poignant expressions of human dignity. The eighth cen
tury DCE epic poem opens with Achilles's menis, a cursed (oulomenen)
"anger" that "brought countless pains on the Achaians, and hurled
the strong souls of many heroes into the depths." The immediate rea
son for Achilles's anger is that he feels he has suffered the violation
of his honor (time), his contextual claim as a chieftain, at the hands
of Agamemnon, who has come to Troy on behalf of Agamemnon's
brother Menelaus to retrieve Helen. In Homer, Helen is the cause of
the conflict, whereas the classical Athenian historian Thucydides attri
butes the war to Agamemnon's ambition, which his formidable navy
affirmed.13 Archaeological remains corroborate ongoing conflict at the
site of Troy leading into the twelfth century DCE. Whatever the cause
of the culminating battles, Homer allows a focus on a culture and its

13

See 1lrncydides 1.1-13.
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values, the violation of which leads to Achilles's anger within the epic,
poetic frame. This context allows for a focus on what human dignity
might look like in the hands of the Greeks.
By the opening of book I of Homer's Iliad, the Greek forces have
sacked the stronghold of Eetion, and Agamemnon has taken as his
war prize (geras) Chryseis, the daughter of a priest of Apollo. When
her father Chryses comes to retrieve Chryseis, Agamemnon not only
insults the holy man, but later threatens to take Achilles's geras, Briseis,
should he be forced to return his. The threat to Achilles-of the loss of
Briseis-is the first of a series of slights-perceived or real-to Achilles
(breaches of his honor) in the Iliad. The audience soon discovers (later in
book I and in book 9) that Achilles's excessive reaction is really about his
own mortality, the poignancy of war revealing both the fundamentally
human reality of impending death and the few consolations that living
might bring in the meanwhile: the esteem that others can grant, rewards
for our labor, trust in social, cultural, and legal processes, to name only a
few. Charles Rubin's framework of the "hyperhuman" would see indig
nity in mortality and death itself; for the Greeks, the treatment of the
person in light of these realities is where dignity is preserved.
If book I establishes the motif of Achilles's menis, then the twenty
fourth and final book of the Iliad resolves this central theme. Whatever
the deeper causes, Achilles immediately refuses to fight the Trojans
because of Agamemnon's theft of Briseis, and the result is the loss of
the best warrior on the battlefield. The enemy brings fire to the ships
of Achilles's forces, the Myrmidons, and this in turn incites Patroclus
to enter the battle (in book 16), dressed as Achilles. In book I and
throughout, we learn that along with Briseis, Patroclus is the only
other person at Troy dear to Achilles; some aspects of the reception
tradition (pottery, for example) even have Patroclus as Achilles's lover.
The intimate friendship or love relationship sets up a catastrophic loss
for Achilles when Hector, the most beloved of king Priam's fifty sons
and the foremost fighter of the Trojans, kills Patrodus. Patroclus' death
sets the stage for the central battle of the Iliad, that between Achilles

--- ......__.-
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and Hector (book 22), which Achilles wins. By this point in the nar
rative, Achilles's cursed and overweening anger first at Agamemnon,
then at Hector, but essentially a struggle with his own mortality-is
such that he begins to drag the corpse of Hector around the city of
Troy to exact vengeance for Patroclus's death. He drags Hector's body
three times initially, when he first kills Hector, and continues to do so
for twelve days. He refuses to eat or drink during that time.
My argument, in light of the foregoing summary, is that the violation
of a substantive human dignity is evident in Achilles's implicit rejec
tion of the idea of forgiveness and reconciliation. He would express
remorse-or at least cessation of his activities-in his willingness to
eat and to allow Hector's family to bury their son. Instead, he performs
actions roundly repudiated throughout the culture, whether we look
to the actions that the gods model, or normative behaviors that dem
onstrate where Achilles has gone wrong.
Book 24 opens with Achilles's wayward ritual, one that replaces the
normative processes that preserve a sense of value (or dignity), prac
tices of assembly, meals, and sleep:
Patroclus' funeral games were done, and the hosts scattered, each
and every man going to his own ship. Surely they provided for
food and delighted in sleep. Not Achilles. He wept at the memory
of his beloved companion, nor did sleep that tames all take him,
but he turned this way and that, longing for the manhood and val
iant might of Patroclus. He wound through the memories of all he
had done with Patroclus and all the pain he had borne. Achilles
thought about his own experiences in men's wars in grievous waves.
Remembering these things he would cry profusely, turning to and
fro in his bed, now on his side, now on his back, and now on his
face. Then again he would get up and roam along the shore of the
sea, distraught.
At daybreak, as the sun shone over the sea and the beaches, he'd
be ready. Every time, he would yoke his swift horses to the chariot,

----�� ···-- .
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and bind Hector behind the chariot and drag him. When he had
hauled him three times around the dirt heap coving (Patroclus] the
dead son of Menoetius, he would pause again in his tent, but he
would allow Hector to be outstretched on his face down in the dirt.
(24.1-18)
Into this madness of Achilles's sacrilegious ritual enters Priam, an aged,
wise, and highly esteemed ruler, to retrieve the body of his son. The fact
of this juxtaposition of dead and living, defeated and victorious, is the
crux of why the scene matters to the substantive discussion of human
dignity. Dignity as a substantive virtue in Homeric society underpins
the passage. Achilles has, for a time, ignored the ritual economy of war
and peace-enemies, but human-and has violated the worth of his
adversary. It is precisely a restoration of worth that Priam would seem
to request. Thus, Priam slips unseen, with the help of the gods, who
support the restoration of dignity, into enemy territory.14 Arriving at
Achilles's hut, Priam "clasped in his hands (Achilles'] knees, and kissed
his hands, the terrible (deinas), man-slaying hands that had slain his
many sons."15
This phrasing of Priam's plea, along with many aspects of the passage,
is easily read as a substantive entry into the subject of human dignity
for the Greeks. In "Dignity's Gauntlet;' Remy Debes cites the chorus
of Antigone on the wondrousness of human beings, who are "mpremely
valuable:' The use of deinos-which I translate above as "terrible" in both the choral ode of Antigone and this passage is not accidental.
"Many are the wonders;' the deina, but none is more "terrible" or won
drous than the human being, as the chorus of Antigone puts it. Similar
to the human being (anthropos) in the chorus of Antigone, Achilles's

14 I am perhaps evading an important aspect of the passage, namely the role of the gods in dignity
and its resroration. I hope to handle this to some extent through the notion of reverence.
15 See Homer, !li,,d, 14.478-79. As elsewhere, I here work from Murray's Loeb translation, adapting
it based on my own interpretation of the Greek.
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hands are not simply deinas because of the terrible damage they can
cause. Rather, these terrible hands are a sign of humankind's capac
ity for both the destructive and the wondrous, a range conveyed in a
word with no parallel, deinos. As Debes puts it with regard to the tragic
chorus, "Of course, those lines [from Antigone pertaining to man's dis
tinctiveness] are juxtaposed against the tragic plot of that play and all
of Creon's folly and hubris." 16 Similarly, the word deinas in Iliad 2.4
conveys the damage that Achilles has done, but like the choral ode in
Antigone, it does so against the backdrop of awe.
So consider again Priam's approach to Achilles in a fuller context:
Great Priam slipped into the tent without being noticed. He went
right up to Achilles and clasped in his hands his knees, and kissed
his hands, the terrible (deinas), man-slaying hands that had slain his
many sons. As when confusion (ate) comes on a man, who in his
country killed another human being and goes to the home of oth
ers, to some rich man, and amazement comes on those who look
on him, so was Achilles struck with wonder at the sight of godlike
Priam. They marveled (thambesin) at each other. They stared at each
other. (2.4.477-84)
The simile compares human to human, whereas most Homeric simi
les are human to animal. The poet compares the sight of Priam to
that of a murderer, and by extension Achilles to that of a man of
wealth. The inversion is telling from the standpoint of human value.
Achilles, the murderer, is an object of wonder, as if a rich man; Priam,
a rich man, is likened to the murderer but also evokes wonder. In
normative terms the murderer is removed from a place of value in
society; he leaves his community, cast out, for a time of purification.
The rich man, in those same terms, could be said to be in an elevated

16 Debes. "Dignity's Gauntlet," 52.

__ _
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place of value, that is, of greater "worth," at least within community.
The community values a rich man more than it does a murderer, and
rightly so. We might return here to the concern expressed earlier
in this chapter that perhaps only some, for example, the elite, the
rich, have a high comparative worth, or are axios, in Homeric soci
ety. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition ofthe one removed from society,
the murderer, with the rich man, who has axios measurable in mon
etary terms, does not in this passage point to comparative value. That
is, the murder is worth no less. Rather, the comparison shows that
both the rich man and the murderer are deinos. Awe is what equal
izes both. Though removed from his local community or ethnos, the
murderer is not removed from a space of human worth: he in fact
arrives elsewhere, though outside of his own community, to a place
of care. Nor because of his money is the rich man "raised above all
price;' the Kantian claim of incommensurable value to which Debes
returns in his discussions of human dignity. Rather, the rich man
embodies a kind of value that approximates virtue, as only a person
(as opposed to an animal) can achieve wealth and has the power to
wield it well or destructively. The rich man is deinos. The murderer,
though, is also deinos and is valued simultaneously, in spite of his
act-counterintuitively, in fact is valued because ofit. Many the won
ders, but nothing is more deinos than humankind, in the ability both
to build and to destroy, to be awesome, and awful.
Similar to the rich man, Priam is a ruler of a kingdom who has
enough wealth to have attained concubines for fifty sons and as many
slaves. Given the depletion of energy and resources that comes with
war, which is a wielding ofwealth and power to destructive ends, Priam
is on the brink of losing all, not unlike the murderer. Paradoxically,
given his former status, Priam-virtually a pauper in terms ofhis loss
stares at Achilles in the same way one would stare at the man ofmeans.
Achilles, though, is in fact not a rich man but herein the murderer,
even if the killing occurs within the sanctioned context of war. W hat
an unlikely comparison! Each man is deinos for the way in which the
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condition of each-belonging and the loss of belonging, elevation and
demotion-illuminates broader aspects of a shared, human condition.
Throughout the passage the language of wonder is repeated: deinos,
thambos. Achilles, now like the rich man, is something deinos, some
thing rare in nature. If an expression of human dignity is the extent
to which we treat others as an object of wonder, or reverence, then
the wonder with which Priam and Achilles stare at each other is tell
ing; they marvel at each other, thambeo. The emphasis in the passage
on their visual regard for one another gives pause, as they momentarily
interrupt the normal course of things-war, their mutual loss, their
status as enemies-to take in all that it means for enemies to inhabit
the same space and status. It might sound odd to reverence a murderer,
whether the one within the simile, or Achilles himself, but this is just
the right term. Reverence might be defined as "the well-developed
capacity to have the feelings of awe, respect, and shame when these are
the right feelings to have." 17 Many the awe-inspiring and awful things,
but nothing is more awe-inspiring or awful than a person.
From the passage, three interlinked aspects of the substance of
human dignity, that is, what it looks like in practice even if Homer
never formulates a thesis on what it is, are evident. First, that Achilles
and Priam regard each other as one would wonder at the rich man
or the murderer-is telling. They share the status of enemies, but this
very fact is why the moment is poignant. Achilles's and Priam's com
mon status as enemies paradoxically points to their stature as human
beings. 18 Each person has lost a loved one in war, and their common
loss unites them, momentarily, in grief.
If regard, wonder, or reverence, is the first clue to human dignity in
this passage, then "stature" as the reason for this wonder is the second.
Although the idea of the imago Dei, the human being as made in the

17 Paul Woodruff, Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press,
2014), 8.

18 Kaceb, Human Dignity.
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"image of God," cannot be said to be operative here in the same way
chat it is in aJudeo-Chriscian context, the wonder, the deinos, is a result
of a certain stature even in Homer. 19 It is telling chat the same epi
thets denoting godlikeness are used of Hector upon his death. Jasper
Griffin's comments are relevant here:
The immediate juxtaposition of "god-like Hector" and "acts of
humiliation" enables the poet to bring out, without sentimentality,
che pathos of the greatest possible fall for a man, from god-like sta
tus to humiliation and helplessness.20
In an oral context where epithets ofi:en do not add meaning and some
times serve merely metrical considerations, it is important to add that
Priam is consistently "in the image of a god;' theoeides, or great, megas,
throughout the passage. Griffin's comments regarding Hector extend
both to Priam and to Achilles in this passage. The "godlike" reminds us
of how far they have fallen in scams, and yet their stature as worthy of
value has not changed.
So what accounts for this stature: the fact chat even chose who have
individual status as enemies, as murderers, as kings, are to be treated
in a certain way? The answer to chis is the third aspect of dignity in
the passage: the men share in reason, a sense of shame (akin to rev
erence), and an ability to pity one another. While reason might be
privileged in some contexts (cogito ergo sum), the interplay between
reason and shame in the ancient world is critical to Greek selfhood.
Dignity discourse ofi:en focuses on the first of these, reason, and yet
shame and pity are linked to reason in the Homeric cext.21 Because
Priam and Achilles have shared human stature, evidenced in reason,
pity, and shame-all ofwhich led to a mutual reverence-they are part

19 Lacer in this volume, Bonnie Kent addresses dignity vis-a-vis the imago Dei.
20 Griffin, Homer, 85.
21 Bernard Williams, Sh.1me and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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of a moral community of unearned worch. 22 "Remember your father;'
Priam says to Achilles, also, tellingly, theoeides, in the "image of a god."
Given their shared stature and loss (ontological and experiential), it
is fitting that Achilles have a sense of shame toward the gods, aideio
theotts, and pity (eleeo) Priam. These men are human not only because
they reason, but also because they have a developed and cultivated sense
of pity and shame. The wonder that comes frorri reciprocally recogniz
ing in the other-from reason, awe, and a sense of mutual suffering-a
human condition reflects the substance of dignity in Homer as a "spe
cial value to humans.'' 23 Achilles and Priam: each has human dignity,
qua status, as a unique individual with special circumstances of loss,
and qua stature, as beings of equal, unearned value. Recognizing this,
Achilles must now return Hector's body.
The poignant exchange between Achilles and Priam is one of three
types of human relationships in the Homeric poems that evidence a
regard for what might be identified as the substance of human dignity
in archaic Greece. This first relationship, one that Achilles and Priam
represent, is that ofenemies toward each other. Similar to the other two
relationships, the treatment of enemies throughout the poems points
to the possibility of dignity's opposite, the possibility of the "erasure
from the space of value.''24 Burial and other ritual aspects of the treat
ment of enemies hint at a substantive sense of the value of all human
life. In fact, if the exchange between Achilles and Priam is a moment
of reconciliation and the high point of the epic, it is possible to find
dignity's opposite in Achilles's treatment of Hector, the desecration of
his body. The gods, particularly Apollo, express how appalled they are
at Achilles's behavior in language that anticipates the right order of
things at the epic's close. Apollo argues that Hector honored the gods

12 Debes, "Dignity's Gauntlet;' 58.
i, Remy Debes, "Human Dignity;• review of Hum,m Dignity by George Kateb, Notre D,m,e
Philosophical Reviews, May i, io11.
l4 Debes, "Human Dignity," on Katcb.
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in life, and thus they are to feel shame in holding back from helping
him now. Achilles is clearly out of step with the norms of Homeric
society, which include the value given to one who had reason, felt pain
and pleasure (emotions), and is deinos (had loved ones, did wonderful
and destructive things):
His mind is not right (.phrenes, enaisimoi), and his intentions
(noema) are bent, like a wild lion, who goes among the sacrificial
beasts of men with great force and fierceness in order to take his
feast. In this way Achilles has destroyed pity (eleos) and has no
shame (aidos). This condition harms men greatly and does not profit
them. (2-4-40-45)
The human-to-animal simile that follows offsets the human-to-human
simile of the exchange between Achilles and Priam. Reason, the
thoughts and intentions of a human being, it might be said, separates
people from raging lions and other animals. Reason, of course, is the
"uniqueness claim" associated with human dignity. Similar to a lion, a
raging Achilles lacks the "inwardness" that makes of a beast a sacrificial
animal (melon), something more than food. But reason does not stand
alone. It enables a developed sense of shame, and pity. Whereas Priam
asked Achilles to have pity (eleos) and a sense of shame (aidos) toward
him, Apollo notes that Achilles lacks eleos or aidos toward Hector. Put
in terms of dignity, Achilles has erased Hector from the space of value.
His treatment of his enemy has reached a point of no return, the type
of crisis that prompts divine intervention throughout Homeric epic.
Thus the example of Achilles makes a positive case for a substantive
understanding of human dignity in Homeric society. His mistreat
ment of Hector, whom Achilles wants to give to dogs and birds of prey
to devour, demonstrates what it would mean for a person within this
social setting to dip below normative value, being now not worthy,
axios, of good treatment. Through the gods, the presence of Priam, and
Achilles's capitulation, the poet establishes this treatment as a violation
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of the norm. The example of Achilles is emblematic of an approach to
human dignity found throughout the Homeric poems.
Although space here does not allow for an exhaustive study, I will
briefly move from the arguments for a substantive claim to human
dignity in Homer to an overview of other cases of the claim. These
cases are the (I) treatment of slaves and the treatment of the less-than
human, which would include animals, and (2) the natural landscape,
the environment.

EXAMPLES OF VIOLATIONS TO DIGNITY FROM
THE ODYSSEY

There are slaves in Homeric society, and this fact calls human dignity
into question. Briseis and Chryseis are slaves, prizes won in battle and
not free to come and go at their own will and pleasure. At the same
time, the contrast in their treatment-the former loved by Achilles
and the latter merely Agamemnon's possession-demonstrates in
brief the contrast in _dignity studies between "unearned worth" (to
love, cherish, value) and "equal worth" (to rule, to be able to enslave,
to be able to have different social statuses within a class structure). As
Debes explains, unearned worth is a metaphysical or conceptual claim,
whereas equal worth is a normative claim.25 As a normative standard,
a society might not extend equal worth to every individual-a king
is in tangible ways worth more than a beggar-while at the same
time recognizing certain claims for all (slaves, women, and so on). In
Homeric society as much as in modern parallels, how one treats the
slave-the pauper, the beggar-is critical to the question of whether
the person is reverenced or erased from the space of value. It is difficult
to make this point without giving an impression of condoning slav
ery. Nevertheless, evidence abounds that slavery, at least as it pertains

>5 Debes, "Dignity's Gauntlec:• 59.
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to the ancient Mediterranean and Near East, was at times the best
recourse available to many members of society, such as the poor, the
orphaned, and the defeated in war.26 Whereas the battlefield context
of the Iliad does not feature slaves and therefore does not give abun
dant examples of their treatment, notwithstanding the women won in
battle, Homer's Odyssey allows entry into domestic spaces where slaves
abound in ancient Greece and even in Homeric society. In this con
text, the slave Eumaeus and his reflections are of critical value.
In the discussion of Hector above, his mistreatment was only for a
time, a result of a momentary lapse on the part of Achilles. In contrast
to this, Eumaeus endures years of mistreatment at the hands of the suit
ors, in the absence of his master Odysseus. Upon Odysseus's return to
his homeland of Ithaca from ten years of war and ten years of wander
ing, Eumaeus, his slave, secures Odysseus's entry into his own home.
The story of how Eumaeus became a slave points to human dignity
and its erasure. Unlike his current handlers, Odysseus treated Eumaeus
well, and despite his current condition, Eumaeus seems to believe that
Odysseus, although disguised as a beggar, is deserving of good treat
ment. Similar to Odysseus's incidental status, slavery for Eumaeus is
a condition into which he has simply fallen. His current status belies
his true worth. Eumaeus's father, Ctesius, was a man of status epieikelos
athanatoisin, "like the gods:' Ctesius is a ruler of not one but two cities
in Syria, but the advent of Phoenician traders disrupts domestic bliss.
These greedy men (troktoi) seduce Eumaeus's nursemaid, who is also
Phoenician and eager to reconnect to her group. The traders take the
Phoenician woman and the young Eumaeus away from his homeland
and sell them for profit (more money, more food).
Given the distinctiveness or moral specialness claim in discussions of
human dignity (which has been evident thus far from Homer's Iliad),

26 Patrice Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave: 1he Ritual of Domination and Social Death in
Homeric Society;• in Reading Ancient Slivery, ed. Richard Alston, Edith Hall, and Laura Proffitt
(New York: Bristol, 2ou), 34-50.
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it should not be surprising that troktoi, the greedy Phoenician men, is
linguistically rooted in eating: for example, animals eating meat raw.
The connection to Achilles, who threatens to eat Hector's body raw,
is easily drawn. Like Achilles, the Phoenicians practice a vice; they do
not know limits. They are out of step with their broader human com
munity. This is in fact the problem with traders as they are represented
in Homeric society: they disrupt a value system by conferring value on
coinage and trade based on approximate value.
Eumaeus, like anyone in human society, finds himself at some point
at the mercy of others. If one is bereft of homeland or a means of re
entry (like the murderer in the Iliadic passage), in a frontier outside of
cities and their civic order, the kindness of strangers (e.g., kings, rich
men, that is, persons of higher material worth and those of more stable
statuses in society) is paramount. The poet describes Eumaeus as a man
"who could have commanded a platoon in war" (14.2.5). In other words,
his unequal status in society as a slave does not destroy his unearned
worth as a person. Slavery disrupts only his human potential, not his
humanness. One might go as far as to say that Eumaeus, if not "esteemed
beyond all price;' is richly valued, despite the suitors' treatment of him.
His father certainly richly valued him. He has noble birth, and the poet
addresses him by apostrophe, the second-person address reserved for a
few beloved characters in Homeric poetry. The fact that Eumaeus spends
his time as a slave "cutting the tanned leather to size" does not make him
any less godlike (dios), even as he speaks of his master Odysseus with an
awe similar to that which is owed to Eumaeus (antitheos).
Odysseus's disguise as a beggar, necessary for his re-entry into Ithaca,
allows the audience some view of the domestic space in Homeric soci
ety, where slaves and other dependents are present. Odysseus's disguise
and his lies about having been a slave express a set of cultural truths,
and in particular underline his shared humanity with Eumaeus.27

17 Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave," 34-so.
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Odysseus's higher social value-his status-as a king does not ulti
mately protect him from the potential violation of his unearned mem
bership in a mo�al community. That is, he is now similar to a slave.
What protects him from mistreatment, now that he is not a ruler? On
the other side, Eumaeus has undergone both kind and unkind treat
ment, and he chooses to extend hospitality to the stranger whom he
does not yet recognize as his own master:
Stranger (xenos), even if someone worse than you came, it would not
be right (themis) for me to dishonor a xenos. From Zeus come all
xenoi and beggars. Our gifi:s to them are small but dear. This is how
it is with slaves because we are always in fear, especially when young
kings rule. (14.56-61)
A sense of what is right (themis) even toward those of lesser social status
("someone worse than you," kakion) drives Eumaeus's thinking, inten
tion, and practice toward strangers (xenos). Strangers and beggars are
like slaves because they are dependent upon the kindness of those of
higher social status or those more tightly woven into the community.
Odysseus weaves a false tale of how he too was sold into slavery and
made to work (ergon) as the telos of his value. These stories of Odysseus
as slave, though lies, link up with Eumaeus's narrative and thus express
the deeper truth regarding human value in the Homeric poems.28
The treatment of enemies emblematic of the exchange between
Achilles and Priam, along with the treatment of slaves and all those
of lesser rank in society (strangers, beggars, the poor, the orphaned),
is a case for the substance of human dignity in Homeric society. Both
kinds of treatment point to the human being's unearned worth, and
specifically, something like unearned membership in a shared (human)
moral community.

18 Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave."
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The third and final relationship to consider in Homeric lore is the
treatment of the less-than-human, which is an aspect of the philosoph
ical discourse of dignity attributable to Kateb.29 As he argues, because
of the stature of the human being, which is linked to reason, the ability
to express reverence and pity, and even the ability to protect others, we
are given stewardship of nature, namely "the impossible task of making
nature be to itself."30 Stewardship of nature is an expression of rever
ence, or awe, a sense that nature, like man, is itself deinon, a "marvelous
thing." As it pertains to the Greek context, the Homeric poems show a
profound regard for this aspect of dignity. The presence of dogs in the
domestic space of the Odyssey, for example, is canny because of what it
might be read to signal about the way the stature of a person impacts
his or her surroundings.
In one of the passages discussed above, where Odysseus first appears
in Eumaeus's hut, dogs rush the stranger. Eumaeus shoos them. While
the incident could be treated as one of those throwaway, possible sub
plots that Eric Auerbach talks about in terms of the "retarding" style
of epic narrative (with all possible plots foregrounded and none subor
dinated),31 Eumaeus's shooing of the dogs is more telling than it might
seem at first glance. As Eumaeus himself puts it, he is accountable
(elencho) for the hounds. Had the dogs mauled the stranger of low sta
tus, Eumaeus (or his master) would have been liable, and he already has
enough grief (algea, stonachas) in his life, having been bereft of home
land, family, the safety of status, and even Odysseus over the foregoing
twenty years.
Of course, Eumaeus's relationship to these nameless dogs parallels
that of Odysseus to Argus, the faithful dog that the master left behind
for twenty years, who now lies in lice and disregarded in dung that

29 Kate6, Hum,m Di_'(llity.
JO Kateb, Human Di,'(llity, , 17.
JI Eric Auerbach, .Mimesis: 1be Representation of Reality in H'estern Liter,zture, trans. Willard R.
Trask (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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could have been used to fertilize the land. (There is such an econo
mizing of resources in the Homeric worldview.) And yet Argus cannot
die until he recognizes that his master, even disguised, has returned
(17.290-305). Such is his loyalty. Through the animal, the third expres
sion of how human beings treat others, the poet makes a deliberate
though as yet untheorized point about dignity.
PRECURSORS TO UNIVERSAL DIGNITY IN CLASSICAL
GREECE AFTER HOMER

My aim here has been to raise the premise of a substantive claim to
human dignity in Homeric society, the fictive context from which
much of our sense of preclassical Greek society after the Bronze Age
derives. Rather than a history of the emergence of dignity, the Homeric
poems and context show dignity operating as a substantive claim from
the beginnings of Near Eastern and early European societies. 32 What
would be lefi: for philosophers is the theorization of dignity as a for
mal or theoretical concern. In the pages that follow, I would like to
suggest that there are further seeds of the discourse of dignity in clas
sical Greece. It will be left to other scholars to amply these claims or
reject them.
In many areas of thought, Homer, as Eric Havelock argues, is a kind
of preface to Plato. 33 The moral, ethical, and social arrangements in
these poems are a baseline to which the Greek playwrights and, later,
Plato and Aristotle will return. Greek popular morality can to a great
extent be derived from these poems, and examples abound: the play
wrights' indirect references to Homer in such plays as Euripides's
Hemba; Socrates's citation of Hector's bravery in death, in the Apology;
or Aristotle's use of examples for moral persuasion, in Rhetoric. Thus
if there is any substantive evidence of human dignity in the Greek
Ji Rankine, "Odysseus as Slave."
JJ Eric Havdock,Pref.ue to Plato (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press ofHarvard Univmicy Press, 198i).
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context, finding that evidence would mean starting with Homer. From
there, we might draw examples from the playwrights for places where a
demonstration of what looks like dignity might be found. Each of the
playwrights presents ample evidence of dignity and, what is more, its
violation, given the context of ritual sacrifice and loss at the festival of
Dionysus.
Examples from Aeschylus might include Agamemnon's violation
of a certain reverence for the life of his daughter Iphigenia (Oresteia),
a sacrifice that resounds even as far off as the Roman poet Lucretius
in the first century DCE as an instance of religion's failure "to guard
and protect what has dignity";34 In the Oresteia (458 DCE), Aeschylus
is interested in the shift from greatness to defeat, such as is found in
Agamemnon's downfall. This concern perhaps parallels the decline of
great aristocratic families that marks the historical advent of demo
cratic society. If Agamemnon loses his status and faces the violation of
his dignity in his manner of death in the first play of the Oresteia, by
the end of the trilogy Orestes has not only restored his family's honor
in his slaughter of his mother Clytemnestra, his father's killer, but he
has also yielded to the power of the Athenian scare, where the Furies
protect the ancient blood-price for Clytemnestra's death at the court of
the Areopagus. Aeschylus's Persians is also important to the discussion,
as a play that reifies the deep divide between Greek and non-Greek,
what Edith Hall calls rhe invention of the barbarian (the beginning
of an ancient orientalism),3S which would continue throughout
the classical period. And yet, despite the inadvertent inscription of
the Persians as "ocher" in the play, the profound humanity of their
plight-the groaning, Atossa's lamentations, the general sense of this
foreign people's loss in status as a result of the Persian Wars-is central
to Aeschylus's representation.

34 Debes, "Human Dignity," 60.
31 Edith Hall, Inventing the B,zrbarian: Greek SelfDefinition through Tr<1gedy (Oxford University
Press), 1989.
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Any place where a shift in status attends, the substance of dignity
can be felt because such a shift calls into question the worth of the
person, his or her stature as raised above all price. If there were a moral
community of unearned worth that transcends the local community
(the ethnos) or the city-state (the polis), a shift in status would exposes
the limits of the local context. For example, Euripides's Hecuba (424
BCE) has been one play that features the degradation of the captive,
slave woman, but it is only one of many.36 Hecuba's shift from queen to
slave, similar to Eumaeus's experience, disrupts how axia or "worth it"
she might be to her own society, but it also enables her to claim a value
that transcends her local environment. How a society treats enemies,
slaves, and the less-than-human matters to dignity, and thus Hecuba
indicts the Greeks because of their poor treatment of her. In fact, the
playwrights could be said to be working through the very problem
of human dignity, even though the historical circumstances of fifth
century Athens engendered no deeper reaction, no more profound
theorization, than they offered.
Similar to Eumaeus and even Odysseus in Homer's Odyssey, Hecuba
has happened into a shift in status, from queen ro slave, as a result of
the fall of Troy. The circumstances of the play have been read as an
ongoing dehumanization of Hecuba. As if slavery were not enough,
pressure is put on her throughout the play, such that continued insult
leads to behavior not becoming of a queen. First, in addition to suf
fering a shift in status to slave, she learns that the Greeks will kill her
daughter, Polyxena, in a sacrifice over the tomb of Achilles. The exter
nalization of a process of reason comes in the Greeks' debate about
whether or not to conduct this sacrifice, until Odysseus, a democharistes
("crowd-pleaser"), casts the dice. Euripides, similar to Thucydides
in his treatment of Cleon (a demagogos or "demagogue" who sways
the community with arguments toward questionable ends), casts
36 Patrice Rankine, Ulysses in Black: Ralph Ellison, Clusicism, and African Amerimn Literatrere
(University of Wisconsin Press), 1006.
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Odysseus in a complicated role, that of a sophist who might be making
the weaker argument appear the stronger. Hecuba appeals to the same
question of how far the ethical community extends to what Philoctetes
prompts in chat play. She claims to have once saved Odysseus's life at
Troy, respecting his stature as human being over his status as an enemy
in war. Odysseus rejects the argument, offering no friendship in war,
no treaty among enemies. In the play, Hecuba suffers what might be
deemed to be existential harm because she is outside of any and every
community: her Trojan community is lost, and the Greeks respect no
treaty or bond with her. W hat is more, she discovers chat her ally and
friend in Troy, Polymester, has killed her son Polydorus, whom she and
Priam sent away from Troy to him for safekeeping at the beginning of
the war. Now all is lost, and Hecuba resorts co the primitive justice of
vengeance with which the Oresteia opened (that is, an appeal co human
rights, laws chat extend co strangers and slaves, more than the ethical
practices we saw in Homer, etc.). In the absence of dignity as part of
ethics, Hecuba is subject to existential harm, but this is a tragic frame, a
space of crisis, not the normal state of things in classical Greece.
The impact of the democratic shift on ethics-the treatment of ene
mies, friendships, and relationships to the state, which Hecuba calls
"equality under the law"-continue to be felt throughout the play
wrights. In Sophocles's Philoctetes ( 409 BCE), Neoptolemus, son of the
late Achilles, faces a moral dilemma in his attempt to retrieve Herakles's
bow and arrow from Philoctetes, whom the Greeks, led by Odysseus,
abandoned on a deserted island at the beginning of the Trojan War
because of his festering wound. They have left him there for ten years,
but a prophecy now reveals chat they cannot defeat Troy without the
bow and arrows. The moral dilemma comes when Odysseus enjoins
Neoptolemus to retrieve the bow and arrows. Spending time with
Philoctetes causes a shift for Neoptolemus, what amounts to an ephe
bic rite of passage chat challenges his ethics. Not only has he come to
pity Philoctetes, with pathos as a starting point for the regard of the
other, but Neoptolemus has also come to regard Philoctetes as a friend
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because of the man's friendship with his own father. That is, if Greek
popular morality, as Kenneth Dover put it, calls for helping friends
and harming enemies, why would Neoptolemus continue the ongo
ing harm that the Greeks have done to Philoctetes, who is a friend of
his friends ?37 Where human friendships end-how far the civic com
munity extends to a broader human community-is unsolvable in the
play's final resolution, as it is in Hecuba. Philoctetes attempts a solution
through a deus ex machina, in which Herakles, now a god, appears to
tell the Greek community that they need his bow and arrow as well as
Philoctetes himself. No warrior should be lefi: behind; Philoctetes has
worth, despite the decade of devaluation that lefi: him bereft of friends,
food, and shelter, and a legacy commensurate to his former status. The
loss of worth that a Greek noble can endure challenges the system of
values in the classical texts, just as it did in the Homeric context.
EPILOGUE

It is worth returning to the search for a formal claim co dignity among
the Greeks with which I opened. The evidence of dignity as a sub
stantive reality in Homeric society and in classical Greece should
be clear. People have dignity throughout the ancient Mediterranean
and Near East, if we base this on the cultural standards for how ene
mies are treated; how strangers, slaves, and beggars are to be treated;
and how these societies regard the less-than-human. Thus, while the
Homeric epics represent Greek society at its best-even in the con
text of war, wandering, and the bad behavior of rulers in the absence
of the kind king-the representation of violations to human dignity
in tragedy gives deliberate pause to the emerging concern of a wide
spread dehumanization of others. This existential threat to human dig
nity results from the premise of imperialism that marks the classical
37 Kenneth J. Dover, Greek Pop11lir Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1994).
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period. The playwrights, along with Thucydides, whose descriptive and
diagnostic treatment of Athenian imperialism falls short of a theory
of human dignity, nevertheless continue the epic tradition of asking
where the human and ethical community begins and ends. Following
Thucydides's analysis of such events as plague and civil strife, it is clear
that the good treatment of everyone within and outside of particular
local communities is an ideal to be guarded jealously. Human dignity,
in practice, is clearly a virtue that can easily slip away, or as Thucydides
puts it of war, plague, and civil strife, human nature, being what it is,
these things will happen again.

